		RESTRICTEP CIRCLE CLASS			
		NTRAL INTEI FFICIAL R			
		ILIVIAL N	.vuiinu j	L 1 /	
ТО			Т	INITIALS	DATE
1	Col. Stanle	y J. Groga			:
2			. ,		
3	221 Adn	nin Bldg			
4			·		
5					
ROM				INITIALS	DATE
ı				RAB	1969
2		****			·
3					
	APPROVAL	LINEO	RMATION		SIGNATURE
	ACTION		CT REPLY		RETURN
	ОММЕНТ	PREP	ARATION OF REF	PLY	DISPATCH
	CONCURRENCE		MMENDATION		FILE
REM.	ARKS: 0.	loved spe	006	ncla	of the
	1107	week some	1.0	0.11	PP
/	convento	0) 16	Man K	mojsi /	I'mee.
	We have	made	1000 10	vision	ns and
	relyted	the Afe	ech,		4
			#13		
SECR	ET CONFID	ENTIAL I	RESTRICTED		ASSIFIED

This is a TEMPORARY DOCUMENT only, for the use of DCI/HS.

The record copy has been released to National Archives under the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM.

Approved For Release 2002/06/18: CIA-RDP84-00161R000100150003-1

STAT

This document has been Approved For Release Proceed 18azClas Review Program ... the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM ... the Central Intelligence Agency.

Date 3/30/92 HRP89-7

Suggest that the theme of the speech be more clearly set out at the outset. There seems to be two general thoughts which run through the speech--first, the similarity between the job of a police department in investigating crime in a local area and that of the CIA in investigating crime (communism) on an international scale. Secondly, the need for coordinated effort in the internal field by those interested in law enforcement, with a central depository of knowledge available to all) and a need for a central depository in the international field with a central depository (which is CIA) for all branches of the Federal Government.

There seems to be a sub-theme to the effect that law enforcement agencies in this country enforce a written law whereas in communist countries they impose political beliefs. The point is well taken but is not well developed and seems to dwindle off in thin air and is lost.

Suggest that indefinite statements be made definite, e. g. "I am sure your job is a difficult one.", change to "Your job is a difficult one." -- ".....it almost sounds as if the East German Government might be creating something more like a military force than a police organization!", change to "The fact is that the East German Government is creating a military force, not a police organization!"

There are several references to the FBI which, while sound politically as between FBI and CIA, may not sit so well with the International Chiefs of Police. It is suggested that a polite and cordial reference to the accomplishments of Mr. Hoover be made in the course of the speech, possibly as a

HS/IIC- 16.3
Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000100150003-1

A Corner

separate paragraph and that other references to the FBI be made more general so as to include such organizations as the Treasury Department.

Particular attention is directed to Page 5 from which one might assume that the International Association of Chiefs of Police would have failed had it not been for the backing of Mr. Hoover. There is considerable hard feeling existing between many police departments and the FBI and without taking sides in the matter, and certainly Mr. Dulles should avoid doing so, it is pointed out that simply by endorsing Mr. Hoover, one is not assured of a friendly reception from this particular body.

On Page 8, there is a lengthy quote from the writings of Stephen

Leacock in which the word "damn" appears several times. It is suggested that this word be omitted as being undignified coming from Mr. Dulles.

While it is true that it is a quote, it is pointed out that the quotes will not show in the spoken word. On this same point, it is stated, still quoting Leacock, that the Chinese feel Americans are full of Oriental cunning; the British accuse us of British stupidity; the Scotch consider us to be stingy; then it goes on to say, "the Italians say they are liars, the French think their morals are loose and the Bolsheviks accuse them of Communism." It is pointed out that the Director would be giving loose morals as a characteristic of the French and labeling the Italians as liars. From his position in international affairs, I think this should be avoided.

With further reference to Page 5, the last sentence states that the centralized fingerprint collection was to be maintained by the IACP.

HS/HC- 163 Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000100150003-1

Approved For Release 2002/06/18: CIA-RDP84-00161R000100150003-1

Actually, it was to be maintained by the FBI for the membership of the IACP and other contributing agencies. This correction has been made in the draft.

SPEECH FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE

It is indeed an honor to appear before this Association which so well represents the coordinated interest in law enforcement on the part of the free world.

Although the problem of law enforcement and prevention and detection of crime is age old and has been an important problem throughout world history, the techniques of the criminal and the techniques of law enforcement and crime detection have changed with historical developments through the years. The basic motivations of the criminal, however, remain essentially the same and will continue to remain the same in the future history of our world. The exercise of police powers and controls has been one of steady development, improved techniques both in administration and application of scientific developments, and in the cooperation existing between the various jurisdictions of police authorities on both a national and international scale.

Since 1917, however, there has been introduced into the world a new element of lawlessness which has become a problem of increasing and serious concern to every law enforcement officer. This problem of lawlessness concerns the breaking of any number of our laws from the improper distribution of handbills on a street corner on through the law structure to espionage in its most serious form. Also included are incidents involving fomenting of unrest, inciting Astribus, riots, protest groups, and other disturbances which have a bearing on the peace and tranquillity of any community. The majority of these elements of lawlessness fall within the purview of the police authorities with the exception of those crimes involving espionage and interstate crimes as

HS/HC- 163 Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CJA-RDP84-00161R000100150003-1

defined by federal law. There is a sharp difference between these categories of crimes and those committed by the ordinary criminal motivated by personal gain and other selfish desires. These crimes I speak of are a land was plann of a foreign power and are prepared, planned, and executed by persons completely devoted to the interests of those foreign powers and against the interests of the United States and the free world. Such crimes are committed with great skill, and great forethought and planning, and backed by an efficient organization. As a rule, the weaknesses displayed in the crimes committed by the ordinary criminal are absent from these types of crimes.

The law enforcement officer of today must not only be an authority on crime prevention for the protection of his immediate community, but he must also specialize in the detection and prevention of those crimes which are directed against the internal security of the United States. In this regard the police authorities of the United States and the free world are working in the front lines against the Communist threat to the internal security of the United States. The horizon of the interest of the police authority has been lifted in these past years from that of local enforcement to that of serving as a most important element in the national defense of our country.

The threat of Communist activity in all its forms, as directed from Moscow, from the satellite governments, and through the mediums of the local Communist Parties in each country, poses a most serious threat in that it is conducted by personnel as carefully selected, as highly trained, as highly motivated, and as skillfully accomplished as are the personnel

As a defense against these Communist tactics, we must influences.

As a defense against these Communist tactics, we must influences.

These stirities, rely on the skill of our police organizations and the flaws of our country. In many cases these laws inadequate to cope with this threat, but the very essence of our national being, our form of government, our laws by men, community with our laws and our concept of democracy, whereas the Communist conspiracy preaches deliberate violation of these laws whenever it suits their purposes. The police authority represents the very essence of democracy in action. He is the front-line defender against the criminal and subversive elements, and yet his enforcement of the law is and must be in strict conformity with the American ideals and traditions.

Let us look at the concept of the police authority of the Soviet or the satellite Communist governments. The police authorities of those countries are not troubled with presenting evidence, as we define it, to convince a jury that an individual is guilty of a crime against the state, particularly in the field of obstructing the Communization of the once free peoples now under Soviet or Chinese Communist domination. The Communist police officer can obtain his convictions for such crimes as obstructionism without any trouble at all. Plentiful evidence comes to police through post office boxes provided for demunciation of fellow countrymen by the peoples, the peoples courts in the Communist world have been instructed by their ministers of justice to avoid what is called pacific thinking which might lead to the mistake of giving lenient

sentences to the state. The Communist courts have demonstrated time after time that they are unlikely to do any pacific thinking for the courts represent the instrument of the state to enforce the dictates of the state and the Communization of all its people and their actions are not based on the laws of free people promulgated for their mutual protection.

Take the case of what the Communists in East Germany call a police organization. There, the policeman is by no means confined to limited conforcementarial laural. Choices of street patrols, directing traffic, or driving a squad car. The East German policeman can go into artillery, tanks, or the air force if he wishes to specialize in these fields. Inasauch as the East German police force numbers around 195,000 men, all trained in army, navy, and air force tactics, it appears that the East German government may be creating something more like military force than a police organization. In view of the unrest that has been evident in East Germany in recent years, one might very easily generate the suspicion and wonder if the purpose of this military-like police force, rather than being to protect the rights of the people, is designed to suppress any disposition that East Germans might show to revolt against the oppressive rule of the Communist masters.

You must realize that my appreciation of police problems is that of an outsider; however, the police problems of the United States are much the same as in the rest of the free world, a problem representing both suppression of crime and subversion. Both of these problems, by their very nature, are interstate and international in their complexion, and the only manner in which they can be vigorously combatted with all

the powers at our control is through the fullest type of coordination and common effort. Whereas your work is wholly concerned with law enforcement in your respective countries, the Agency that I represent is expressly forbidden by law to take any part in the enforcement of law. In fact, one of the most significant provisos in the Act of Congress which created a Central Intelligence Agency, is that which excludes this Agency from any "police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions."

But even though the work of the Central Intelligence Agency legally cannot, and most certainly will not, invade your particular field, this Agency is frequently in need of your help and appreciative of all you do for it. In particular I should like to say that the assistance and support rendered by the chiefs of police in various city and state organizations has been of the grestest value to the Central Intelligence Agency. I hope we may continue to receive your cooperation.

Although an intelligence agency in a free country must be excluded from any part in the work of the police, there are obvious similarities between the two. Both must be concerned with the collection of evidence; both must undertake careful research in the analysis of the evidence; both must make deductions based on this analysis; and both must produce a well-reasoned and authenticated case based upon the whole process.

I don't think I need to go into detail about any of these similarities. But there is another that I should like to bring to your attention which may be less evident: namely, the parallel between the growth in recent times of integrated police procedures on the one hand, and the development of centralized intelligence on the other, because they were irreducible conditions of life in this twentieth century.

The year 1908 makes a good starting point. In that year O. Henry published "The Gentle Grafters" which told about some lovable charlatans who went from place to place in the southwest swindling the public and getting away with it because they could avoid punishment by keeping on the move. Law enforcement was considered a local problem then and was locally handled. The "Gentle Grafters" were always safe in the next town. It was in that same year, however, (some fifteen years, by the way, after the founding of your own organization) that more than local aspects of crime were recognized by the Attorney General in the formation of the first Federal Bureau of Investigation. But the establishment of the FBI and its beginnings as an effective organization, were not necessarily synonymous. As everybody knows, it is no coincidence that the FBI became a real factor in the enforcement of federal law in 1924 when J. Edgar Hoover became its head. One augury of a successful future for the enterprise came when Mr. Hoover, as one of his first acts, established a centralized fingerprint collection to be maintained for the International Association of Chiefs of Police and all other contributing agencies and departments.

With the establishment of these two organizations - one a federal bureau and the other a voluntary association of police officials - enormous progress was made in the direction of bringing crime prevention into line with the realities of our times.

The Central Intelligence Agency also represents great but incomplete progress in a problem of achieving cooperation. The origins of this Agency date from the time when the United States not only could not

afford a local view of internal affairs, but could no longer afford a national outlook in international affairs.

Nowadays, the United States <u>must</u> care about world alliances and world opinion, primarily because the world is smaller - just as the local police authority in America must interest himself in affairs beyond his own community because the United States is smaller.

It has been said that not just the garrison at Pearl Harbor, but all of us, were sound asleep on the morning of December 7, 1941. We were awakened, then and there, to the sort of world we were going to have to live in thereafter. We might have gone back to sleep again after the war, as had been our custom after previous wars, but the events of 1946 alone were enough to show us that there could be no sleep for the kind of world power that we had become. Aside from the fact of world leadership, and the more obvious elements in the world balance of power, there were two main reasons for this: the existence of explosive situations in many parts of the world, and the existence of an international conspiracy that was bent, among other things, upon making them more explosive.

We were confronted as a reality, as I have previously mentioned, with a vast political organization determined, regardless of any laws either civil or moral, to interfere with the rights of people in any non-Communist country to organize their political life as they saw fit. The arms of the International Communist movement with its headquarters in Moscow strates into every corner of the world and is supported by an elaborate organization to carry out its activities.

As chiefs of police from all over the United States and from foreign countries, you know this international conspiracy well and at first hand, for it operates wherever it chooses, with disregard for local law except where it hopes to pervert the safeguards of the free world to its purposes. I am sure the FBI could not discharge its responsibilities to protect the United States against such internal subversion except through the invaluable cooperation of state and local police authorities any more than you could do your job as well as you do now without the cooperation of the FBI. We too, by the way, work in cooperation with the Bureau and of the fall of the

Largely because of what your organization represents, I feel certain that the international Communists are going to find it harder and harder to make any progress, by means of internal subversion, in undermining the freedoms that they wish to destroy.

The Central Intelligence Agency was, of course, not expressly formed by Congress to combat international Communism outside the area where national police forces deal with it, but this naturally became one of its tasks. In 1947, however, Congress was aware of this Soviet-led conspiracy that increased the danger of war by forceful annexation of new territory, and by attempts to weaken and divide the free countries. In a perilous world, grown so small that disaster could happen far more suddenly and unexpectedly than at Pearl Harbor, there was little alternative to the establishment of central intelligence in some form. Without a sound intelligence system, there could be no real protection against the dangers that beset us.

But just as the beginnings of national and international police cooperation did not coincide with the establishment of police forces themselves, so the creation of Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 did not coincide with the beginnings of intelligence activities on the part of the United States. Intelligence - which, simply defined, is knowing what is happening in other parts of the world - has always been a function of our government, even though on a smaller scale than was customary in many other governments.

The Central Intelligence Agency was not devised by Congress as a means of setting intelligence activities in motion; but rather as a way of bringing together all the activities of the government related to intelligence and making them function harmoniously toward the single end of national security. If you read the National Security Act of 1947, you will find that the main duty of Central Intelligence is to "coordinate"; that is to say, its job is to supply the means through which diverse activities may be unified for recognized purposes.

In these complicated times this is no mean job. You can imagine, for example, that the United States Government receives a good deal of information from abroad. Some of it comes as a by-product of our normal transactions in foreign countries; some comes by way of the information that foreign countries normally publish for the rest of the world to see; some is deliberately sought for intelligence purposes. All of this information has to be studied, sorted, analyzed, and filed away for reference. What can be gleaned from it of importance has to be assembled and sent, in the form of various reports, to those in authority who need the information. This job of coordination belongs to Central Intelligence.

There is nothing very glamorous about the process. In essence, it more resembles the work of a scholar, piecing together information stored in libraries than it does the romantic intrigues of the beautiful international spy so dear to the hearts of those who purvey fiction to an eager public. I suspect that you follow me more exactly in this matter than most people could, since you must see the parallel between our work and the painstaking research that you do in preparation for an apparently sudden and dramatic arrest and conviction.

Painstaking research has largely taken the place of dramatic adventure in intelligence. Once upon a time, when a small group of men controlled foreign policy in the name of the king, possession of their immediate plans meant knowledge of their country's intentions. In those days, the shifty agent who could penetrate the confidence of this group was an indispensable, if not wholly desirable, element in intelligence work. But in modern times, although a small group of men (as fin the USSR) may control a nation's foreign policy in theory, it cannot do so in fact.

For that reason, it is necessary, in order to understand a country's intentions, to know much more than what its rulers would <u>like</u> to do. You must find out what those rulers can and will do in terms of their own strengths and weaknesses and their relations with the rest of the world. Particularly with respect to a major foreign power, this requires a great deal more than any one agent, no matter how astute or resourceful, can possibly find out.

In fact, espionage, either exciting or humdrum, is not the primary answer to the problem. The answer is partly to be found in manifold kinds of information gathered from numerous sources (mostly quite public)

about conditions all over the world; and partly in what a great many people of many backgrounds and specializations can make of this information after they have put it all together. No single intelligence agency of any government could provide the answer. The coordinated efforts of many parts of the government and of the nation generally must be combined if even a partial answer is to be found.

The job of Central Intelligence is to provide this service of coordination to the government and particularly for the benefit of the National Security Council, to which I directly report. As you know, the National Security Council, whose chief members are the President of the United States, the Secretaries of State and Defense, represents the President's special advisory body on questions of foreign policy. Although I sit with the Council as Director of Central Intelligence, I neither vote with it nor do I give it advice regarding foreign policy. The reason is that neither the formation of foreign policy nor advice on what policies to follow is the business of intelligence. My function — aside from advising the Council on matters of intelligence organization — is to provide foreign information pertinent to the policy deliberations of the National Security Council and for the benefit of those who give the Council advice.

This foreign information has been gathered and compiled by the Agency of which I am Director, in cooperation with other agencies of the government, particularly those concerned with intelligence in the Departments of State and of Defense. Before it is considered ready for the Council, however, it is fully discussed with the heads of military and civilian

intelligence (including, of course, Mr. Hoover or his representative) to make sure that all of us are in agreement on the accuracy of our facts and the authenticity of the interpretation placed upon them.

One of the ultimate aims of police work, I take it, is to make all the facts available to a court in order that it may render a sound verdict. Our aim is similar, except that our "court" is the National Security Council. I suspect that in the long run, both of us proceed in much the same way in assembling and presenting these facts.

Upon your success depends the protection of society against the criminal and subversive elements in it. Upon ours depends, in part, the protection of our national security against the lawless element in international affairs. Apart from the physical protection represented in the military establishment, a sound and working intelligence system is the best protection that any government may have against that element.

In the eight years since Congress brought the Central Intelligence Agency into being, we have made considerable progress toward carrying out its mandate. We have not, of course, solved all the problems. Although intelligence was already old in the government in 1947, the idea of central intelligence was new. Old habits had to be changed; new methods of procedure had to be devised and made to work. I am aware that the problem of coordination within a single government faced by Central Intelligence was perhaps simpler than that which has long faced your organization in relating the work of many governments; but it was complicated enough and did not yield to immediate solution.

At the present time, however, I am convinced that intelligence is so organized for the United States that we can confidently face the

Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000100150003-1

terrifying complication of the twentieth century in the knowledge that our policies are guided by sound information, and that our defenses are well prepared against any attempt at a surprise attack. We will continue to improve our services toward these goals.

May we all work together for the good of our country.